PUBLICATIONS
(with Justin Conrad and Megan A. Stewart @ Journal of Conflict Resolution)
What is the relationship between natural resources and rebel governance? Previous studies have argued that resource rich groups have fewer incentives to provide social services. We argue, however, that even well-funded rebels may have incentives to provide some social services to civilians. Specifically, rebel groups profiting from the extraction of natural resources should be more likely to offer health care services as a means of ensuring a dependable civilian workforce than groups who do not profit from natural resources. Using data on both the extraction of natural resources and social service provision by rebel groups, we find strong empirical evidence to support our argument. We conclude with implications for scholars and policymakers.
(with Sara M. T. Polo and Kaisa Hinkainen @ International Studies Quarterly)
Previous studies have highlighted that United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations are effective at reducing violence during civil wars. But can these operations also change the incentives of the warring parties and lead them to pursue non-violent alternatives? This article provides the first direct test of UN peacekeeping troops’ effectiveness at inducing non-violent engagements, specifically negotiations during civil wars. Our analysis of disaggregated monthly data on peace operations, negotiations, and violence in African conflicts (1989–2009) reveals that sizable deployments of UN military troops, by themselves, are insufficient to foster negotiations, even when they reduce battlefield violence. Instead, the probability of negotiation instances is conditional on rebel tactics. We posit, when rebels engage in terrorism, peacekeeping troops can inadvertently alter the “power to hurt” of the belligerents in favor of rebel groups and create conditions conducive to negotiations. Our results have important implications for research on the effectiveness of both peacekeeping and terrorism and for policy-making.
IN REVIEW OR REVISION
Delegitimizing Rebels in Civilian Courtrooms?
Incumbent Justice and Rebel Governance During Intrastate Conflict
Incumbent Justice and Rebel Governance During Intrastate Conflict
(with Justin Conrad - Under Review)
Across civil conflicts there is significant variation in how incumbent governments wage counterinsurgency. Besides fighting rebels on the battlefield, some simultaneously prosecute rebels in the courtroom. Even more perplexing is that rebels are prosecuted in civilian courtrooms when the de jure, and arguably more preferred venue for enemy combatants is a military one. Why would incumbents utilize civilian trials to prosecute rebels in the midst of armed conflict? Moreover, why prosecute some rebels and not others? We argue that incumbents may be more likely to pursue this form of justice during internal armed conflict when rebels engage in governance activities that undermine the legitimacy of the state as the sole governing authority. Here, civilian trials become a forum where rebels can be demoted from their status of political revolutionaries to mere criminals. To examine our argument, we conduct the first large-N analysis utilizing new data on incumbent justice and rebel behavior. After accounting for alternative arguments and across varying model specifications, we find strong empirical evidence to support the plausibility of our argument.
| Draft Manuscript |
WORKING PAPERS *
"Rebel and Incumbent Law:
How (In)compatible Legal Preferences Impact Post-Conflict Power-Sharing"
How (In)compatible Legal Preferences Impact Post-Conflict Power-Sharing"
(To be Presented at APSA 2021)
Civil conflicts are notoriously intractable. Even after adversaries agree to formalize peace and power-sharing, civil wars recur around 50 percent of the time. While the conventional wisdom emphasizes who should govern or who should control territory as the main incompatibilities of civil war, the exclusive focus on executive or territorial control blinds researchers to another critical incompatibility: adversaries’ legal preferences. This incompatibility occurs when the legal institutions and proscriptions that rebels have for serving fundamental functions of government—a formalization and aggregation of their values, beliefs, and expectations for how society should be or is structured—diverge from the incumbent's. If the state and sub-state actors in dispute have divergent legal preferences, but both groups are expected to work within the same governing legal system in the post-conflict environment, then these divergent preferences can obstruct dispute resolution by delegitimizing said system and incentivizing the actors to return to fighting. To test this theory, I develop a legal system (in)compatibility framework that focuses on rebel and incumbent legal preferences over particular issue domains (e.g., recognition of social diversity, property rights, source of law, and procedural justice). This theoretical framework motivates my data collection effort, which is the first cross-national dyadic dataset of rebel and incumbent law from 1989-2006.
"Two Sides of the Same Coin?
Explaining Rebel Governance and Terrorism"
Explaining Rebel Governance and Terrorism"
(with Sara M. T. Polo, Megan A. Stewart, and Jessica Maves Braithwaite)
Existing research suggests that rebels who govern should be more interested in legitimacy, a factor negatively associated with the use of terrorism. Yet, nearly 55% of rebels who engage in governance also engage in terrorism within the same conflict year and often in the very same territorial spaces. What explains the use of these seemingly orthogonal strategies across time and space? We argue that center-seeking revolutionary rebels are more likely to engage in both strategies of governance and terrorism, than all other rebel groups, in response to external and internal threats to their governance project. Because governance by revolutionary rebels is a political project intended to transform political and social orders, rebels are willing to expend the necessary resources to sustain it even at the detriment of their military capabilities. This is especially problematic for center-seeking revolutionaries who seek control of the central government. Given their unique requirements for military victory, such groups are more likely to use the ``weapon of the weak'' to pressure states into concessions, while preserving important political changes they may have achieved throughout their areas of governance. Additionally, these groups are likely to maintain their use of terrorism within areas of territorial control as a governance policing tool in response to civilian non-compliance. We examine our arguments quantitatively with data on rebel social service provision and terrorist tactics in civil conflicts from 1970-2003. Moreover, we examine the implied mechanisms underlying rebels' political and military efforts within the same territorial space using spatial data and a discussion on the Islamic State.
| Working Paper |
"Incremental or Transformative?
The Effect of Civil War on Constitutional Change"
The Effect of Civil War on Constitutional Change"
(with Maria Aroca, Keith E. Hamm, Nancy Martorano Miller, and Ronald D. Hedlund - To be Presented at APSA 2021)
Does civil war have an effect on institutional change? Some scholars posit that we should expect to see transformative, as opposed to incremental, changes following such a large event. Because civil war by definition occurs between two or more actors attempting to disrupt the status quo, we examine the effect of civil war on constitutional change - the institution responsible for structuring a nation state’s status quo. We expect to observe transformative constitutional changes if the civil war terminates with a victor whose legal preferences for
governance are not embodied by the remaining constitution. Moreover, we expect continuity of these changes to be dependent on whether the victor maintains law-making powers. If the victor and loser have divergent legal preferences, but the loser gains law-making powers in the post-civil war period, then we expect to observe an endogenous rupture to the remaining constitution. To examine our theoretical argument we leverage original data on state constitutions before and after the American Civil War (1776-1901). We find strong empirical support for our theoretical argument.
governance are not embodied by the remaining constitution. Moreover, we expect continuity of these changes to be dependent on whether the victor maintains law-making powers. If the victor and loser have divergent legal preferences, but the loser gains law-making powers in the post-civil war period, then we expect to observe an endogenous rupture to the remaining constitution. To examine our theoretical argument we leverage original data on state constitutions before and after the American Civil War (1776-1901). We find strong empirical support for our theoretical argument.
| APSA 2021 Civil War & Constitutional Change WP |
"Justice and Militias During Intrastate Conflict"
(with Santiago Sosa and Gladys Zubria)
The literature on pro-government militias (PGMs) posits that states use them to cheaply and quickly bolster their security forces, coup-proof, and even delegate atrocities to avoid accountability. States, however, also make use of the judiciary to put rebels on trial and undermine their legitimacy in the midst of armed conflict, which, based on the conventional wisdom (plausible deniability), would leave leaders (the executive) open to accusations of human rights abuses by their agents (militias). How do we explain the use of these seemingly contradictory strategies? That is, under what conditions are we more likely to observe the use of tribunals in tandem with PGMs? We argue that states choose to combine tools of war based on both feasibility and liability avoidance. If courts are independent and the militias they use are officially linked to the state, governments would prefer to use military tribunals against rebels. However, if courts are not independent, then governments may utilize civilian courts against rebels and militias to abuse human rights with a lower risk of being held accountable for these abuses. We examine our argument utilizing cross-national data on during-conflict justice and PGMs from 1981-2007.
"Getting the Law on Your Side:
State Legal Frameworks and the Enforcement of Economic Change"
State Legal Frameworks and the Enforcement of Economic Change"
(with T. Clifton Morgan)
Over the past decade, we have seen a significant shift in sanctions enforcement and design, especially by the United States. Surprisingly, little scholarly research has been devoted to improving our understanding of why these changes have occurred, let alone the implications of these changes. In this paper, we argue that variations in the legal frameworks under which sanctions are imposed significantly affect the enforcement of sanctions and ultimately their design and effectiveness. Applying our theoretical argument to the U.S., we examine this argument in more detail and show that laws imposed for reasons unrelated to economic sanctions triggered changes in three key variables: jurisdictional reach, evidentiary burden, and burden of proof. These changes mitigated the costs of enforcing sanctions against financial institutions, which has resulted in increased fines, penalties, and settlements against those institutions and a shift in policy preference toward financial sanction designs and away from trade sanctions and more comprehensive designs. We contend that our argument provides a more nuanced explanation of the mechanisms underlying these changes and suggests that a key to understanding sanctions lies in understanding the mechanisms of sanction law enforcement. Our paper concludes with a discussion on future research.
*Only complete drafts are listed under "Working Papers."
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you are interested in receiving a draft that is not posted above.*
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you are interested in receiving a draft that is not posted above.*